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CAPITAL FORMATION IN NEW CO-OPERATIVES IN CHINA: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE
1 











This  paper  aims  to  fill  one  knowledge  gap  on  understanding  the  issue  of  capital 
formation in new co-operatives in developing countries. By doing so, it presents the 
main findings of capital formation and investment in a small sample of horticulture 
shareholding co-operatives in rural China, because shareholding co-operatives, as one 
best example of new multi-stakeholder co-operatives in China, have become a vehicle 
to  mobilize  additional  resources.  To  better  understand  shareholder  co-operatives’ 
stakeholder heterogeneity, two main groups of stakeholders are identified, namely, 
member  stakeholders  (investor-members  and  patron-members)  and  non-member 
stakeholders  (non-member  investors  and  non-member  donors/grant-givers). 
Following a brief theoretical overview concerning co-operative multi-stakeholdership 
and  capital  acquisition  and  constraints,  I  then  analyze  both  the  rules-in-form  and 
rules-in-use  with  respect  to  the  co-operative  stakeholders’  capital  involvement  in 
China.  
 
Cases  observed  indicate  a  hybridization  feature  of  the  co-operative  capital  base, 
including  member  contributions,  public  subsidies,  income  from  the  market  sale, 
institutional capital and social capital. There exist at least four ways to raise equity 
capital  from  co-operative  members.  External  capital  comes  mostly  from  direct 
government support in the form of grants and project funding, and indirect financial 
support through preferential treatment and policies. Different from the situation in the 
West, debt capital does not appear to be a widely-used traditional financing source. 
New co-operatives in China have difficulty even in borrowing short-term debt, not to 
mention  receiving  long-term  loans.  Also  specialized/non-traditional  external  capital 
sources such as those provided by co-operative banks do not suffice. Co-operative 
banks are not always ready to provide micro-credit to co-operatives. Only when the 
government plays an active role, this lending process is facilitated. Many innovative 
financial systems are also observed in the field, which facilitate the mobilization of 
more external capital for co-operatives. 
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1. Introduction 
Previous research indicates the emergence of multi-stakeholder co-operatives (MSCs) 
in the West (a.o. Pestoff, 1995; Borzaga and Mittone, 1997; Münkner, 2004; Borzaga 
and Defourny, 2001; Defourny and Nyssens, 2008; Gijselinckx and Develtere, 2008; 
Gijselinckx,  2009;  Girard,  2009),  and  its  importance  to  economic  participation  and 
social cohesion (Galera, 2004; MacPherson, 2004; Thomas, 2004). In recent years, 
the rise of MSCs has also been witnessed in China (a.o. Xu, 2005; Xu and Huang, 
2009; Zhao et al., 2009; Zhao and Develtere, 2010a). 
 
As member-driven business organizations, traditional co-operatives primarily rely on 
member  contributions  in  terms  of  shares,  fees  and  business  transactions.  But  in 
today’s  competitive  market,  finding  capital  is  still  one  of  the  most  prominent 
challenges they face (Von Pischke, 1993; Harris et al., 1996). Therefore, they need to 
mobilize both more member contributions and outsider finance to fund their growth 
without threatening their co-operative character. Both in the West and China, external 
capital nowadays has a more prominent role than two decades ago (van Dijk et al., 
1997; Kyriakopoulos, 2000; Côté, 2001; Gijselinckx and Develtere, 2008; Zhao et al., 
2009). In the West various innovative financial instruments, such as those adopted in 
US  new  generation co-operatives  and  European co-operative  holding  systems  have 
been developed to realize the same goal (Cook, 1995; Van Dijk, 1997; Lang et al., 
2001;  Chaddad  and  Cook,  2002;  Iliopoulos,  2002).  In  China,  the  shareholding  co-
operatives (SHCs), as one best example of these new multi-stakeholder co-operatives, 
have been a vehicle to mobilize additional resources. 
 
However, while the reality of mobilizing co-operative capital investment in the West 
has  been  studied  extensively,  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  situation  in 
developing countries. Almost two decades ago, motivated by the financial crisis faced 
by farmer co-operatives in many developing countries, FAO in collaboration with the 
COPAC
3, launched a research program on examining agricultural co -operative capital 
formation in three developing countries (Guatemala, India and Kenya). But nowadays, 
less effort has been made. Internationally, the new co-operative development in China 
is  widely  unknown,  not  to  mention  the  situation  concerning  capital  formation  in 
agricultural  co-operatives  of  China.  The  peculiar  historical  development  of  co -
operatives in China may explain this knowledge gap. 
 
Against this background, this research aims to fill this gap by providing empirical 
evidence from China. To focus my research, the MSCs examined in this study are the 
SHCs existing in rural China. The SHCs refer to agricultural co-operatives in the form 
of farmers’ specialized co-operatives (FSCs) and land-based co-operatives that have 
emerged in some of the most developed coastal areas as well as in peri-urban rural 
areas  with  rapid  urbanization  and  industrialization  in  China  (Zhao  and  Develtere, 
2010a). Stakeholders in the SHCs in China include member groups such as big-scale 
and small-scale farmer members and local enterprises, as well as non-member groups 
like government agencies, financial institutions, local communities, etc. 
 
Through this analysis, the study aims to answer the following questions: (1) What 
kind  of  policies  and  legal  requirements  exist  concerning  co-operative  capital 
acquisition in China (i.e. rules-in-form)? (2) What can we witness in agricultural co-
operatives in practice (i.e. rules-in-use)? (3) To what extent have new co-operatives 
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indeed opened their doors to different forms of member capital investments and non-
member capital participation? And what are the consequences? 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief overview of theoretical 
insights  is  presented  concerning  co-operative  multi-stakeholdership,  capital 
acquisition  and  constraints.  Afterwards  I  analyze  the  legal  context  specifying  co-
operative  stakeholders’  capital  involvement  in  China.  Empirical  evidence  will  be 
presented in section IV based on data gathered from 20 cases in the SHCs in rural 
areas of Zhejiang Province in China. The last section draws conclusions by looking for 
explanations  for  this  important  modification  of  co-operative  practices  and  the 
consequences for their capital base. 
 
2. Theoretical reviews 
 
2.1 Co-operative multi-stakeholdership 
Nowadays,  it  is  widely  observed  that  global  changes  in  the  business  environments 
have  significantly  influenced  co-operatives  and  require  new  types  of  co-operative 
organizations.  Numerous  cases  show  that  the  classic  co-operative  model  with  an 
inward-economic orientation has gradually transformed into a new model with a more 
outward-community  orientation  thus  forming  the  emergence  and  development  of 
multi-stakeholder  co-operatives  (Pestoff,  1995;  Turnbull,  1997;  Levi,  1998; 
Gijselinckx  and  Develtere,  2008;  Girard,  2009).  Internationally,  these  new  multi-
stakeholder organizations have been labeled as social enterprises (a.o. Borzaga and 
Defourny, 2001; Nyssens, 2006; Defourny and Nyssens, 2008). According to Borzaga 
and Mittone (1997), these new hybrid organizational forms are the outcome of a mix 
of  associative  and  co-operative  models.  With  the  law  adopted  in  Italy  creating  a 
specific  legal  form  for  “social  co-operatives”,  the  co-operative  movement  has 
engendered the first appearance of the concept of social enterprises. 
 
Theoretically it finds its potential power thirty years ago in Laidlaw’s idea of building 
co-operative communities (1980)
4. MacPherson’s social dimension of co-operatives is 
well inspiring with its emphasis of “common capital” system instead of regarding co-
operatives  as  mere  agglomerations  of  members  (2004).  Empirically,  it  is  widely 
proved in several countries in the West, such as those identified by Borzaga and Spear 
on co-operative movement orienting to the direction of revitalizing the communitarian 
tradition (2004). Several countries have adopted or revised laws recognizing multi-
stakeholder  co-operatives.  Girard  (2009)  proposes  that  some  of  these  laws 
characterize the field of activities of multi-stakeholder co-operatives and others simply 
focus on the notion of multi-stakeholdership. The cases examined by Gijselinckx and 
Develtere (2008) in Europe also prove this trend of co-operative renewal. In China, 
the new co-operative movements and the emergence of the SHCs are regarded as 
best evidence of new multi-stakeholder co-operatives (Zhao and Develtere, 2010a). 
These numerous eminent observations make one believe that this phenomenon has 
become  common  enough  to  deserve  more  profound  theoretical  consideration. 
However, in contrast with countless discussions about multi-stakeholder theories  in 
analyzing mainstream corporations (See, for example, Donaldson and Preston for an 
excellent overall review of the three aspects of the theory; cf. Donaldson and Preston, 
1995;  Barry,  2002;  Jensen,  2002;  Phillips,  2003),    there  exist  less  theoretical 
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underpinnings (especially in English-written literature) for the newly emergent multi-
stakeholder  co-operatives
5.  With  co -operatives  involving  more  upstream  and 
downstream  activities,  the  phenomenon of stakeholders’  heterogeneity  has  become 
more obvious. Furthermore, this has recently changed from the heterogeneity among 
new  and  old  members,  active  and  inactive  members,  as  well  as  non-member 
shareholders,  to  the  even  more  complexity  adding  by  processing  enterprises,  and 
small-scale and big-scale farmers as well. They contribute different amount of capital 
investment  according  to  their  diverse  objectives.  These  multiply  objectives  from 
different groups can be conflicting, in which a compromise decision should be reached 
as a result of bargaining processes. At this point, collective-choice-and-action studies 
in a co-operative organization facing groups of heterogeneous members have been 
conducted  by  several  agricultural  economists.  They  view  co-operatives  either  as  a 
coalition of utility maximizing subgroups (Zusman, 1992; Albaek and Schultz, 1997; 
Hendrikse, 1998; etc.), or as a “nexus of contracts” in which business relationships 
among co-operative stakeholders are regarded as contractual relationships (cf. Cook 
et al., 2004). According to Cook, Chaddad and Iliopoulos (2004), this latter approach 
is really a loose coordination of agency theory (Eilers and Hanf, 1999), transaction 
cost  economics  (Hendrikse  and  Veerman,  2001),  and  property  rights-incomplete 
contract theory (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002). And their commonality is contractual in 
nature.  For  the  purpose  of  this  paper,  I  do  not  plan  to  examine  those  economic 
modelers further but focus my discussion on the stakeholder theory justifications per 
se. Nonetheless, for a multi-stakeholder co-operative with multiply objectives, these 
theoretical approaches mentioned above enrich one’s understanding on the existence 
of various  problems  traditional  co-operatives  face  (Sexton  and  Iskow,  1993;  Cook, 
1995; Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Xu, 2005), and thus advance one’s thinking on how 
new co-operative structures/alternative co-operative models can best deal with these 
problems (Chaddad and Cook, 2002). 
 
Gijselinckx  (2009)  has  once  made  the  attempt  to  examine  the  way  co-operatives’ 
stakeholders can be conceived by virtue of the inspiration of the stakeholder theory
6. 
Based  upon  it  s he  presents  a  distinction  between  four  models  of  stakeholder 
management in co-operatives, a continuum from the classical single -member model 
to  a  strong  multi -stakeholdership.  The  division  of  weak  and  strong  multi -
stakeholdership is somewhat similar to Vidal’s argument (2009), stating that working 
as a partnership among different stakeholders has two forms, i.e. multi-stakeholder 
dialogue (every stakeholder gets a voice) and multi-stakeholder governance (every 
stakeholder gets a voice and vote). However, back to my discussion on stakeholder 
theory  dealing  with  co-operative  stakeholder  heterogeneity,  I  need  to  nevertheless 
address the question of how to balance the various or even conflicting interests of co-
operative  stakeholders.  One  opinion  holds  that  stakeholder  theory  implies  all 
stakeholders  must  be  treated  equally  irrespective  of  the  fact  that  some  obviously 
contribute more than others to the organization. This is regarded by Robert Phillips as 
one  of  several  “straw-person  objections”  posed  by  critics  of  the  theory  (Phillips, 
2003). In response, Phillips, also inspired by “Clarkson Principles” (1999), holds the 
principle  of  meritocracy  as  the  interpretation  of  this  balance  which  can  also  be 
regarded  as  the  principle  of  stakeholder  fairness
7. Not coincidently, moreover, this 
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principle resonates with the principle of “financing in proportion to patronage” when 
discussing  the  democratic  control  and  proportional  voting  issues  in  co-operative 
studies  (Robotka,  1947;  Phillips,  1953,  Schaars,  1957).  Although  co-operative 
governance issue is not the focus of the paper, it is highly relevant to the co-operative 
stakeholders’  capital  involvement  issue,  as  well  as  the  question  on  what  kind  of 
conditions should exist in order to motivate more member capital investment, which 
turns  out  well  to  be  the  focus  of  the  paper.  Furthermore,  it  should  be  noted  that 
financing  in  proportion  to  patronage  is  based  on  the  “concept  of  proportionality”, 
which is rooted in the work of Phillips (1953; cf. Royer, 1992). However, there exist 
various  difficulties  in  reality  pointed  out  by  Abrahamsen  (1976)  when  putting  this 
principle into practice. 
 
Another  crucial  question  under  hot  debate  concerns  with  the  distinction  of 
stakeholders. Based on the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency Mitchell et al. 
(1997) have identified eight types of stakeholders. A more general division constitutes 
two main groups: "primary" and "secondary" stakeholders, or “inside” and “outside” 
stakeholders (Jones, 1995), or “supply-side” and “demand-side” stakeholders (Ben-
Ner  and  Gui,  1993),  or  “normative”  and  “derivative”  stakeholders  (Phillips,  2003) 
which  follows  the  taxonomy  of  Donaldson  and  Preston  (1995).  This  distinction  is 
surely also varied as a result of a broad or narrow interpretation of the stakeholders. 
Some  prefer  the  former
8,  while  others  prefer  the  latter,  and  even  pragmatically 
suggest  not  using  “stakeholder”  whenever  it  can  be  replaced  by  the  other  more 
concrete  term  (Leys et al.,  2009)
9.  Concerning  the  paper’s  topic,  I  propose  that a 
basic  division  in  a  co-operative  organization  should  constitute  member  and  non-
member  stakeholders.  Following  the  discussions  on  a  heterogeneous  membership 
within this new co-operatives (Xu, 2005; Huang, 2008), I tend to expand this debate 
to a  multi-stakeholdership  model  identified  by  both  member stakeholders  including 
investor-members  and  patron-members
10, and non -member stakeholders involving 
non-member  investors  and  non -member  donors/grant-givers.  Understanding  the 
relationships between these various stakeholde rs and the way they cooperate and 
have a say in the decision making, appears very important if one tries to understand 
this new co-operative organizations as an indigenous model of social enterprises in 
China (Zhao and Develtere, 2010b). 
 
2.2 Co-operative capital acquisition and constraints 
Capital acquisition has long been cited as a problem for co -operatives (Helmberger, 
1966).  The  difficulties  co -operatives  face  in  raising  funds  is  receiving  increasing 
attention  as  co -operatives  diversify  their  operation s  to  include  further  processing 
activities  (Harris,  1995;  cf.  Harris  et  al.,  1996;  Cook  and  Iliopoulos,  2000). 
International agencies (like FAO, COPAC, ILO, the World Bank) have also observed 
that  capital  formation  is  at  times  a  major  challenge  for  co-operatives,  which  often 
                                                                                                                                                                  
how value is added that is consistent with their contributions to the organization. In other words, balance does 
not imply equality of voice or share of outputs. Voice and share—and therefore a sort of priority—should be 
based on contribution to the organization. The more a stakeholder group contributes to the organization, the 
greater their voice and share of value created should be (Phillips, 2003: 162). 
8Townsley,  in  a  report  examining  fisheries  systems,  pr oposes  that  the  term  "stakeholder"  needs  to  be 
interpreted in the broadest possible sense, at least initially (Townsley, 1998). 
9They argue that the stakeholder-notion by itself is “empty and often used in vain”, and “there is in fact no such 
thing as ‘stakeholder theory’”. 
10It  should  be  noted  that  patron -members  also  provide  basic  shares,  similar  to  investor -members  (who 
contribute investment shares too). These basic shares can be qualification shares/common shares, or can be just 
in the form of membership fees.   7 
appear to be undercapitalized (cf. Von Pischke, 1993). According to Cook (1995), this 
problem of being undercapitalized is due to the co-operative property rights structure. 
Facing  capital  constraints,  a  new  institutional  arrangement  has  been  designed  and 
introduced in the US co-operatives, and this new generation co-operatives have been 
hereof studied extensively (Cook, 1995; Harris et al., 1996; Van Dijk, 1997). In order 
to  mobilize  more  capital  sources,  co-operative  holding  systems  have  been  also 
developed  in  many  European  co-operatives  (Van  Dijk,  1997;  Harte,  1997).  Some 
scholars  also  compare  these  institutional  innovations  in  US  and  European  co-
operatives  aiming  to  overcome  the  capital  constraints  faced  by  traditional  co-
operatives  (Lang  et  al.,  2001;  Iliopoulos,  2002).  It  is  claimed  that  organizational 
restructuring is necessary to create a clearly defined property rights structure thus 
complementing  innovative  financial  instruments  such  as  investment  shares  and 
delivery and earnings rights, because “financial instruments  alone may not suffice” 
(Iliopoulos, 2002). Also the membership policies should be rethought in favor of long-
term financing methods European co-operatives adopt. 
 
Generally speaking, co-operative capital comes in two forms: equity and debt. Equity 
capital is the internal sources provided by the members who invest in the co-operative 
to get needed services. It is also referred to as ownership capital, member’s share, 
patient capital, member funds, net worth or risk capital. Equity capital includes initial 
capital investment (membership fee or share, common stock, preferred share/stock or 
investment share, etc.), and capital obtained through operation (for example, retained 
patronage  refunds).  Correspondingly,  there  exist  patron-members  and  investor-
members in co-operatives. Debt capital means borrowing funds from external sources 
including non-member investors and the investing public (who may invest capital in 
the co-operative to earn dividends), and loans from such lending agencies as a co-
operative bank or a commercial bank. They are therefore non-member investors or 
creditors. In most cases, a successful co-operative adapts a judicious mix of equity 
and debt capital which will make it possible for the co-operative to meet its present 
goals and objectives and those that might be anticipated (McBride, 1986, p. 169). Yet 
in pursuing the initial capital for a newly organized co-operative, share capital from 
the  members  is  considered  as  the  most  important  financial  source  for  starting  its 
operation. Moreover, some studies show that co-operatives raise new debt mainly in 
the form of short-term borrowing,  and co-operatives may have difficulty borrowing 
long-term  debt  due  to  the  fact  that  commercial  banks  are  uncomfortable  with  the 
“unorthodox” ownership structure (Lerman and Parliament, 1993), and the dynamic 
nature of co-operative equity associated with various retention and redemption plans 
(Cobia and Brewer, 1989). 
 
Capital  formation  is  regarded  as  a  means  of  increasing  member  participation  and 
control  (COPAC,  1995).  Consequently,  co-operative  capital  has  a  qualitative 
dimension,  which  is  based  on  the  proposition  that  different  types  and  sources  of 
capital  have  different  degrees  of  what  might  be  called  “co-operative  power”.  The 
quality  of  co-operative  capital  is  defined  by  the  intensity  of  member  commitment 
demanded by the terms and conditions attached to the various forms of capital used 
by co-operatives (Von Pischke, 1993, p. 44). Some types and sources of funds do a 
better job of promoting cooperation and empowering co-operative societies to achieve 
that mix of ideals, democratic processes and commercial performance that constitutes 
the promise of cooperation and that creates the epic of member-controlled self-help 
activities.  It  is  proposed  that  institutional  capital,  which  is  collectively-owned  non-
refundable capital, is designated as the highest quality capital (Von Pischke, 1993, p. 
20).  These  unallocated  retained  earnings  is  also  the  main  source  of  capital 
accumulation  (McBride,  1986,  p.  161),  and  plays  more  and  more  roles  in  co-  8 
operatives’  financial  structures,  according  to  the  data  study  provided  by  Royer, 
Wissman and Kraenzle (1990). Yet too much institutional capital may also result in 
perverse incentives (Murray, 1983), which conflicts with the co-operative service-at-
cost principle (Schrader, 1989, p. 119-120; cf. Royer, 1992)
11. Also, in the developing 
countries, public funding is mostly made available to co -operatives in terms of loans 
or shares, or even grants or project funding. While government grants are considered 
as the lowest quality co-operative capital, it is suggested that public agencies should 
provide financial support in the form of loans or shares, because the incentive and 
constraint mechanism existing in these forms make sure that the funds would be used 
more effectively. 
 
When  a  co -operative  needs  more  capital  due  to  enlargement  of  operation,  for 
example, it can appeal to non-member investors or creditors for loans or investment 
shares.  This non-member equity can take various forms, like non-member patrons in 
USA, local parties in France, institutional investors in the Netherlands, and public -
listed shares in Ireland (Kyriakopoulos, 2000, p. 46). Yet, more capital from the 
members-users should always  be encouraged, which is in accordance with the co -
operative principles of “user-owner, user-control and user-benefits” (Dunn, 1988). It 
can be done either by collecting additional share capital from the existing members, 
or  attracting  new  members  to  accumulate  more  members’  shares.  Co-operative 
lawmakers try to solve the problem of how to satisfy the need for flexible methods of 
capital formation without departing from co-operative principles. In several countries 
(e.g. Germany, Italy, South Africa and partly in France), the "one member one vote" 
principle has been softened up or simply abandoned to facilitate capital mobilization. 
However,  unlike  the  scholars  who  support  for  the  idea  of  proportional  voting 
aforementioned (Robotka, 1947; Phillips, 1953, Schaars, 1957), that reality is being 
actively opposed by many other co-operative researchers (cf. ILO, 2001, p. 82). 
 
Nonetheless,  a  distinction  is  still  made  between  the  cooperatives  in  the  standard 
business  sense  and  those  with  the  common goal  of fostering  social  harmony.  It  is 
prescribed that in the former case “equity” is most appropriate/dominant principle as 
a distributive value, which would otherwise be “equality” in the latter case (Deutsch, 
1975, 1985; Greenberg, 1990). In a co-operative, when there exists no big difference 
in members’ capital contribution, member equity  is generally  not required to be  in 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  financing  in  proportion  to  patronage.  Therefore,  it 
also leads to “equality” both in patronage distribution and voting right. While for a co-
operative with highly heterogeneous members, the principle of financing in proportion 
to  patronage  has  been  more  and  more  adopted.  Empirical  studies  from  China 
presented in the following also provide evidence to this phenomenon. 
 
Finally,  It  is  worth  noting  that  social  capital  can  be  widely  seen  as  another  co-
operative resource in reality. According to Evers (2001), social capital-building may be 
an aspect of the social embeddedness and of the manifold and diffuse side effects of 
such  types  of  action  and/or  it  can  become  an  explicit  goal  and  purpose  of  the 
organization. Among various social capital forms, in most cases, donations (in cash, in 
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3. Rules-in-form: regulations and legal context in China 
Multi-stakeholder  co-operatives  have  been  witnessed  as  the  most  dynamic  social 
enterprise organizations nowadays in rural China. This dynamics is a combining result 
of both the effect of a creative vibrant civil society in rural China, and the influences 
from various national policies in the 2000s, especially the issuance of seven Number 
One  Documents  annually  concerning  the  “three  rural  issues”  since  2004,  and  the 
implementation of a first National Co-operative Law after China’s reform and opening-
up
12, influenced by the international co-operative experiences and principles. In what 
follows I will examine these rules-in-form concerning co-operative capital formation. 
 
-  Capital involvement concerning members 
According  to  the  Administrative  Regulation  on  the  Registration  of  FSCs  (the  State 
Council, No.498), members may make financial contributions either in cash or non-
monetary  yet  transferable  property  that  can  be  converted  into  cash,  like  physical 
objects and intellectual property
13. Before the promulgation of the national regulation, 
the Regulation on FSCs of Zhejiang Province (the NPC of Zhejiang, 01 January 2005) 
requires that every member shall subscribe shares, and members can unite together 
to subscribe shares on a voluntary basis. Shares subscribed by members engaged in 
production should be more than 50% of the total share capital (Article 13, emphasis 
added). However, the national Regulation which has been promulgated two years later 
does not contain such requirement on share subscription, in order to encourage more 
co-operatives  to  be  established  in  economically  less-developed  areas  in  China
14. 
Moreover, the Regulation of Zhejiang also sets a limitation on the number of shares 
every member or a group of uni ted members may own (no more than 20% of the 
total shares), in order to avoid that invested capital would  become the basis of 
control.  Members’  share  capital  in  most  cases  equals  to  co-operative  registered 
capital. And the Regulation of Zhejiang states that the registered capital shall be more 
than 50,000 rmb in order for a co-operative to be registered (Article 6). There is no 
such requirement in the national Law
15. An additional requirement in the national Law 




Concerning patronage refunds to members, the national Law stipulates that the total 
amount returned shall be no less than 60% of the distributable profits (Article 37). It 
                                                 
12The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Farmers’ Specialized Co-operatives (the National People’s Congress, 
01  July  2007).  Hereafter  FSCs  is  short  for  Farmers’  Specialized  Co-operatives.  It  is  a  “mutual-aid  economic 
organization, which is voluntarily formed by production and business operators of similar agricultural products 
or by providers or users of similar agricultural production and business operation services on the basis of rural 
household  contractual  management  and  which  is  subject  to  democratic  management”  (Article  2,  emphasis 
added). 
13The value of the non-monetary property shall be determined by all members through evaluation. No member 
may contribute with labor service, credit, name of a natural person, business reputation, franchise right or 
property on which there is a guarantee, etc. (Article 8). 
14Therefore it gives a great amount of flexibility to each co -operative, who can stipulate it in its own Charter 
(according to Article 18). 
15Another difference is that the number of members involved in a co -operative should be more than seven, 
according to the Regulation of Zhejiang, while this number should be more than five according to the national 
Law. It is obvious that the requirement set by the national government is lower than those by local government. 
16It further regulates that if the total number  of members is 20 or less, there may be one enterprise, public 
institution  or  organization  as  its  member;  if  the  number  exceeds  20,  the  number  of  enterprises,  public 
institutions or organizations shall not exceed 5% of the total number (Article 15).   10 
means that there is a specific limit on the dividend rate a co-operative can pay in 
proportion  to  the  capital  contribution  (at  no  more  than  40%  of  the  total  allocated 
profits). Apparently it is much higher than that established by most statutes around 
the world
17. This fact is said to be appropriate for the current capital-scarce yet labor-
abundant reality in rural China. This may create more incentives for a co -operative to 
accumulate member’s equity capital. Another incentive shown in the national Law is 
the allowance of additional votes. However, the total number of additional votes shall 
not exceed 20% of the total number of the members' basic votes (Article 17). 
 
According to the national Law, every co-operative may draw common reserve funds 
(public  accumulation  funds)  from  the  profits  of  the  year  (emphasis  added,  which 
means it is not compulsory but optional). The common reserve funds shall be used for 
making  up  for  losses,  expanding  production  and  operation  or  be  converted  into 
members' capital contributions. The common reserve funds drawn every year shall be 
quantified  as  shares  of  each  member  according  to  the  stipulations  of  each  co-
operative  Charter  (Article  35).  This  quantification  method  is  suggested  to  be  in 
accordance with the amount of services used by the members, therefore in proportion 
to the patronage (Ministry of Agriculture, 2008, p. 78). It is nevertheless not specified 
in the Law. 
 
At the termination of the membership, the member can get back the amount of the 
capital contribution as well as personal shares of the common reserve funds recorded 
in his/her account in the co-operative (Article 21). 
 
-  Non-members capital involvement 
Non-members  capital  involvement  includes  loans  a  co-operative  borrows  from  the 
financial  agencies  and  subsidies  and  grant  directly  given  by  the  government,  and 
social  donations  it  receives  sometimes.  The  Law  makes  clear  that  the  state  “shall 
promote the development of FSCs through fiscal support, tax preferential treatments, 
support  in  finance,  science,  technology  and  talents,  as  well  as  through  industrial 
policies” (Article 8).  More supportive policies are also formulated in Chapter 7 of the 
Law. Article 50 states clearly that the central and local governments shall respectively 
allocate  funds  to  support  the  FSCs
18.  While  Article  49,  through  supporting  the 
government to assign or entrust with FSCs the construction projects related, also 
indicates the financial support from the government in the way of project funding
19. 
Moreover, FSCs also enjoy some preferential treatment in taxation prescribe d by the 
Notice concerning the Relevant Tax Policies for the FSCs (No. 81 of the Ministry of 
Finance and the State Administration of Taxation, 01 July 2008). According to Article 
51, the state also encourages the commercial financial institutions to provide financial 
services  to  the  FSCs  by  diversified  means.  However,  it  does  not  provide  more 
regulations in detail dealing with the difficulty in accessing micro-credits, which has 
been  long  obsessed  by  the  farmers  in  China.  The  Number  One  document  of  2009 
encourages  FSCs  to  carry  out  credit  mutual-aid.  In  the  same  year,  an  Opinion 
concerning Supporting Financial Services to FSCs (No. 13 of China Banking Regulatory 
                                                 
17Which is usually 8% or less in the United States, according to Baarda (1986), for example. 
18These financial supports shall help FSCs in providing services in respect of information and training, quality 
standards for agricultural production and their authenticat ion, construction of infrastructure for agricultural 
production, marketing and technology dissemination, etc. Article 50 also states that “priority shall be given to the 
FSCs in ethnic areas, outlying areas and poverty-stricken areas and to the ones engaging in the production of 
major farm products which are urgently needed by the State and the society”. 
19Very  recently,  a  further  Opinion  on  Supporting  Qualified  FSCs  to  undertake  Public  Projects  concerning 
Agriculture (No. 6, 04 May 2010) has been promulgated.   11 
Commission,  05  February  2009)  has  been  issued,  fostering  pilot  program  of 
establishing  credit  mutual-aid  co-operatives  based  upon  FSCs  through  capital 
financing from commercial banks. Furthermore, the Number One document of 2010 
also emphasizes to encourage the establishment of village banks and loan companies 
along  with  credit  mutual-aid  co-operatives.  Actually,  supporting  policies  concerning 
fostering  farmers  to  establish  mutual-aid  organizations  can  be  found  earlier  in  the 
Number One document of 2006. 
 
Before examining what is happening in practice, I should conclude my discussion on 
these  rules-in-forms  by  emphasizing  one  fact  that,  under  the  national  Law  (as  its 
name demonstrates), only one sort of agricultural co-operatives called the FSCs can 
register. This indicates that all sorts of other forms including associative co-operatives 
or  co-operatives  providing  comprehensive  services  are  actually  “out  of  legal”
20.  It 
means  currently  many  innovations  are  perplexed  with  “a  legal  mix”,  which  may 
potentially  inhibit  the  practices  conducted  by  co-operatives  in  order  to  motivate 
members and non-members to contribute more capital. 
 
4. Rules-in-use: observations in the field 
Royer  (2002),  in  a  paper  analyzing  co-operative  principles  and  equity  financing, 
claims “despite the fervor with which specific principles are advanced, co-operative 
practices often appear to be influenced as much by individual self-interests, economic 
considerations,  and  statutory  restrictions”.  It  seems  to  show  that  co-operative 
practices do not necessarily follow what have been required by those rules-in-form. 
Indeed, as our previous research on the development of the SHCs in China indicates, 
both  institutional  and  ideological  legacies  from  the  past  and  resources  and 
environments  in  the  present  have  led  to  the  formation  of  a  heterogeneous  yet 
innovative  new  co-operative  form  that  deviates  from  the  dominant  paradigm 
prevailing in orthodox co-operatives (Zhao and Develtere, 2010a). When examining 
the capital base of this new co-operative sector, I therefore also tend to ask how co-
operative  stakeholders  capital  are  involved  in  reality  and  what  kind  of  conditions 
needed for them to invest in the co-operative. 
 
In my research, case studies have been used to obtain information and insights. This 
is because, similar to situations in many other countries around the world, one major 
challenge for doing empirical research on co-operative capital formation in China is in 
gathering large sample yet credible data. Therefore, case studies are regarded as one 
best alternative means. Through my initial research, I am informed that although a 
substantial  diversity  concerning  agricultural  co-operative  development  level  can  be 
witnessed from Province to Province, most of agricultural co-operatives in Zhejiang 
Province  have  adopted the  shareholder ownership  structure.  That is  why  I  tend  to 
focus my case studies to this Province in China. As aforementioned, Zhejiang has had 
its local co-operative law as the first one in China even before the promulgation of the 
national law. It demonstrates that the co-operative development in Zhejiang is well 
advanced  comparing  that  in  the  other  areas  in  China.  For  the  reason  of  data’s 
comparability,  all  the  co-operative  cases  chosen  are  horticulture  co-operatives.  In 
2006, a large sample survey has been conducted organized by Provincial Agriculture 
Department  in  collaboration  with  several  eminent  scholars  in  co-operative  studies 
from  Zhejiang  University.  Before  case  discussion  and  analysis,  ,  the  main  findings 
                                                 
20Yet, interestingly enough, a Co-operative Law of PRC was once formulated in 1950, in which the regulations are 
more comprehensive than those in the current Law. Under that law of 1950, various kinds of co-operatives, like 
consumer co-operatives or handicraft co-operatives can register. Unfortunately, that law did not come into being 
due to political reasons later on.   12 
concerning capital formation from this survey are presented first, in order to provide a 
macro-perspective on capital arrangement in this region
21. 
 
The survey has distributed 600 questionnaires to co -operatives in different areas in 
the Province; 500 have been sent back, among which 372 are regarded to be valid.  
The result shows that the average number of co-operative members is 140, while the 
average amount of total share capital reaches 694,000 rmb. However, it is also not 
surprising that there exists a great variety with respect to the amount of total share 
capital (min 5,000 rmb till max 80 million rmb). This amount is mostly small, with the 
result showing that 19.8% of co-operatives investigated have the total share capital of 
less than 50,000 rmb, and 50% of them have less than 100,000 rmb. While less than 
9% of the co-operatives examined have the total share capital of more than 500,000 
rmb (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Total Share Capital of FSCs in Zhejiang (2005) 
10,000 rmb  0.5-5  6-10  11-30  31-50  51-100  101-8000 
Frequency (number)  69  97  102  49  18  13 
Frequency (%)  19.8  27.9  29.3  14.1  5.2  3.7 
 
Concerning  the  percentage  of  shares  owned  by  the  largest  shareholder  in  the  co-
operative, the figures in Table 2 show that this percentage ranges from min 0.9% to 
max 80%, with the average percentage of 15.24%. In 65.6% of the co-operatives 
investigated,  the  percentage  is  below 20%  (while  30.4%  of  co-operatives  with  the 
percentage of 20%). More than 4% of the co-operatives under the survey allow their 
largest shareholder to hold more than 20% of the total shares. 
 
Table 2 The percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder of FSCs (2005) 
%  0.9-5.0  5.1-10.0  10.1-15.0  15.1-19.9  20  20.1-80.0 
Frequency (number)  40  81  44  79  113  15 
Frequency (%)  10.8  21.8  11.8  21.2  30.4  4.0 
 
Table 3 presents some interesting phenomena. The percentage of shares owned by 
the  top  ten  largest  shareholders  ranges  from  4.5%  to  100%  of  co-operative  total 
shares  (there  are  57  co-operatives  in  which  the  top  ten  largest  shareholders  hold 
100%  of  total  shares  in  their  co-operatives).  In  merely  5.4%  of  the  co-operatives 
investigated (20 co-operatives out of 372) the top ten largest shareholders hold less 
than 20% of the total shares, while we should keep in mind that the average number 
of members is 140 according to the survey. This indicates that in most co-operatives, 
there co-exist a small number of big shareholders (as core members) and a great 
number  of  small  shareholders  (as  common  members).  This  reality  of  member’s 
heterogeneity coincides with the fact that most co-operatives in the region have been 
initiated by a small group with the ability to invest plenty of capital. They attract then 
many farmer-producers as patron-members who provide in most cases only a small 
amount of qualified/basic shares, or membership fees. 
 
Table 3 The percentage of shares owned by the top ten largest shareholders (2005) 
%  4.5-20.0  20.1-40.0  40.1-60.0  60.1-80.0  80.1-100.0 
Frequency (number)  20  52  91  80  129 
Frequency (%)  5.4  14.0  24.5  21.5  34.7 
 
                                                 
21The  result  of  the  survey  can  be  found  from  Xu  and  Huang  (2009).  For  more  information  concerning  co-
operative capital formation in Zhejiang, please consult Xu and Huang (2009, p. 102-103).   13 
Data  from  the  cases  help  one  understand  in  detail  what  kind  of  capital  formation 
patterns  investor-members  and  patron-members  exactly  shape  from  the  micro-
perspective,  and  what  kinds  of  other  capital  resources  exist  in  reality  for  co-
operatives. As aforementioned, before the promulgation of the national co-operative 
Law in 2007, Zhejiang Province had already established a regional co-operative Law in 
2004. Under the regional Law all co-operatives had registered just as co-operatives 
(as  a  special  business  entity/enterprise  legal  person).  After  the  issuance  of  the 
national Law, co-operatives in Zhejiang have undergone a registration change from 
“co-operatives as a special business entity” to “specialized co-operatives”, and thus 
obtaining  business  license  of  farmer  specialized  co-operatives  from  the  local 
Administration for Industry and Commerce. I use this registration change opportunity 
to  look  for  any  change  in  capital  formation,  because  many  co-operatives,  for  the 
reason  of  efficiency,  have  used  this  opportunity  to  enlarge  their  capital  base,  or 
formalize  any  share  capital  change  that  happened  already  before  the  registration 
change.  During  the  fieldwork  conducted  in  November  and  December  of  2009  in 
several regions of Zhejiang, I have thoroughly investigated 20 cases of horticulture 
SHCs. Data is gathered through a combination of semi-structural interviews with key 
figures in the field, as well as documentary analysis. After analysis and synthesis I 
find out that co-operative fund-raising comes mainly from two sources: members and 
non-member grant-givers (i.e. the government and similar public agencies). 
 
Co-operative  fund-raising  from  members  can  be  increased  through  the  following 
various ways: 
-  No  new  members  are  involved,  existing  members  provide  more  capital  as 
shares; 
It is a relatively simple situation of capital formation. The co-operatives under 
this situation are found out to be relatively small-scale in terms of membership. 
Another  feature  is  that  there  exists  no  big  difference  in  members’  capital 
contribution.  One  case  of  HYX  co-operative  shows  that  eight  members  add 
more capital from 20,500 rmb to 50,000 rmb (each holds 10% of total shares 
decreasing slightly from 10.25% per person before), while the contribution of 
the  director  changes  to  100,000  rmb  (increasing  from  18%  to  20%  of  total 
shares).  Therefore,  the  percentage  of  shares  every  member  holds  does  not 
change much. In 2007, this co-operative draws 12.3% of the surplus as public 
accumulation  funds.  The  rest  of  the  surplus  is  distributed  according  to 
patronage (40%) and according to shares (59%)
22. 
-  No new members are involved, existing members offer more funds as loans; 
In small-scale co-operatives internal financing is another popular way to raise 
capital, when micro-credits from the banking system is not always easy to get, 
and there is no enough time or no interest to enlist more members. From the 
meeting notes of DWF co-operative it can be  seen how the difficulty in capital 
turnover was solved when the co-operative needed more capital to reseed the 
fruit plants. Three members from the Board of Director had a meeting first and 
prepared  a  plan,  proposing  every  member  provide  extra  10,000  rmb  as 
circulating capital. Four days later, the general meeting with all 30 members 
was held. During that meeting, a different solution was yet agreed, namely, the 
co-operative would borrow 50,000 rmb from two members from the Board of 
Director instead of raising funds by everyone, “considering the actual economic 
strength of the members in general” (from the meeting note). From this one 
                                                 
22It needs to be repeated that, according to the national Law, the total amount of patronage refunds shall be no 
less than 60% of the distributable profits (Article 37).   14 
can see that due to the limited economic capability, most farmer-members face 
the difficulty to contribute more capital. Most members contribute share capital 
initially in order to use various services the co-operative provides rather than 
for  investment.  Considering  the  principle  of  equality,  the  co-operative  is 
originally composed of 30 members, each contributing 1/30 of the total shares. 
This “borrowing” more capital from the members does not change the original 
capital contribution pattern. 
-  New  members  are  involved,  they  contribute  more  capital  as  shares; 
It is a typical situation for those co-operatives which are initiated by several 
core  members  first,  and  absorb  more  common  members  later  for  various 
reasons. In some cases this is because they need to change the shareholding 
arrangement in accordance with  the regulations  in the newly  published Law; 
and in some other cases this is due to the fact that more farmers in the local 
area are willing to join in the co-operatives because they have observed that 
members  of  the  co-operatives  have  finally  earned  more  incomes  than 
themselves; and also in some cases this member increase is finalized because 
the director of the co-operative wishes to help more producers with financial 
difficulties.  Three  co-operatives  can  represent  each  of  the  situations 
aforementioned. 
In the first case of HLF co-operative, there were originally six members (two of them 
holding  25%  of  total shares  per person,  two  holding  18.75%  per person,  and  two 
holding 6.25% per person). Although the Regulation of Zhejiang stipulates that the 
number of shares every member or a group of united members may own should be no 
more than 20% of the total shares, it is obvious that two big shareholders hold shares 
more than required. Interestingly enough, they use the opportunity of the issuance of 
the  national  law  to  mend  up  their  shareholding  arrangement  by  absorbing  more 
members, although there is no such requirement in the national law. Currently, there 
are 36 members, 26 of which hold less than 1% (including 1%) of total shares per 
person. And the two big shareholders hold 20% of total shares per person. 
 
In the second case of ZDM co-operative, the membership has added from seven to 
150  at one  time.  The  director held  20%  of total  shares  before,  but  now  only  5%, 
diluted  by  more  capital  added  by  new  members.  The  director  does  not  wish  to 
contribute more capital. More than 90% of members hold less than 1% (including 1%) 
per person of total shares. In 2007, the average income of a member is 60% higher 
(or 13,000 rmb more) than that of a non-member farmer producing the same fruit in 
the local area. This is partly due to the fact that this co-operative chooses to distribute 
all  the  distributable  profit  in  proportion  to  the  volume/amount  of  the  transactions 
members made with the co-operative (after deducting 20% as public accumulation 
funds and 20% as public benefit funds). This means no distributable profit is returned 
according  to  the  amount  of  share  contributions.  For  a  great  number  of  farmer-
producers who need the co-operative service but who are too poor to contribute more 
capital, this profit distribution method is without doubt the best way to maximize their 
incomes. 
 
The  capital  change  in  the  third  case  of  XQG  co-operative  is  also  very  interesting 
because  similar  to  the  case  of  ZDM,  it  is  also  a  case  which  can  illustrate  the 
transformation of traditional co-operatives from mutual aids to become more oriented 
to the whole community and strive for social finality. In 2008, after three years of its 
establishment, the membership involved has reached 103. 90 members hold less than 
1% of total shares per person, most of whom are destitute households or household   15 
with  the  disabled.  The  co-operative  teaches  them  how  to  plant  vegetables  thus 
helping those who might otherwise become marginalized in the employment market. 
 
There  is  another  prominent  situation  revealed  in  the  survey.  It  appears  in  several 
cases  that  new  members  are  not  directly  registered  members  according  to  the 
member lists that co-operatives should provide to the local Administration for Industry 
and Commerce. But in fact, the capital they provide is  indeed regarded as shares. 
Accordingly,  shareholding  rights  and  responsibilities  are  demonstrated  through  a 
share  right  consignment  agreement  made  individually  between  the  co-operative 
registered members and new members as non-registered members. The local official 
who facilitates my research confirms that those non-registered members are indeed 
members of the co-operative, and this practice is meant to avoid lots of troubles that 
might  arise  every  time  when  the  co-operative  capital  base  changes  and  the  co-
operative is required to inform the local Administration for Industry and Commerce of 
the  changes.  It  works  in  this  way:  through  this  consignment  agreement  a  non-
registered  member  provides  capital  shares  to  the  cooperative  via  a  registered 
member, thus accounting for a certain percentage of capital shares of the registered 
member. 
 
-  New members are involved, they provide capital only as membership fees but 
not as shares; 
This way of capital acquisition happens when the initiator of the co-operative is mostly 
a  co-operative  entrepreneur  who  regards  the  co-operative  both  as  a  for-profit 
enterprise in front of outsiders (i.e. businessmen outside the community), and as a 
not-for-profit organization for local farmers and co-operative members. I come across 
two cases from different places in the field that exemplify this situation. 
 
According  to  the  membership  arrangement  in  one  case  of  BHB  co-operative,  328 
members  are  composed  of  three  types:  core  members  (28  persons);  tight-knit 
members (100) and associative members (200). Members of the first two types are 
those who provide share capital. Among them, members of the second type should 
provide 2,000 rmb/person as shares, whereas members of the first type contribute 
5,000  rmb/person or  more  (the capital  contribution of the  director reaches  75,000 
rmb, or 15% of total shares).  Members of the third type provide only membership 
fees  of  50  rmb/person
23.  Accordingly,  members  of  the  first  two  types  bear  the 
business risks and thus enjoy, besides patronage refunds, the surplus dividend i n 
proportion  to  the  capital  contribution,  while  associative  members  only  receive 
patronage refunds. Similarly, in the other case of DKB co -operative, there are 13 
principal members and 90 associative members. Capital contributions of the principal 
members vary also greatly, from the director contributing 19.93% of total shares, to 
the  thirteenth  largest  shareholder  contributing  less  than  0.05%  of  total  shares. 
However, they all receive surplus dividend in proportion to the capital contribution. 
While the rest 90 members who provide membership fees of 200 rmb/person only 
receive  patronage  refunds.  But  when  asked  if  they  would  like  to  absorb  more 
members, the directors of both co-operatives answered “no”, because “it would be too 
costly” (interviews in the field). Those additional costs could come from more costs for 
providing  training  courses  and  extra  costs  for  administration.  On  average  the  co-
operative  pays  500  rmb  for  one  member  (including  training  costs,  risk  costs  for 
providing protection price to members selling products to the co-operative, and “social 
cohesion” costs for buying moon cakes during the Mid-Autumn festival and seasonal 
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gifts during the Chinese New Year, just to name a few). Therefore, “the members are 
very willing to pay 50 rmb membership fees, because they actually receive far more 
benefits” (interviews in the field). Mentioning the motivation for this capital acquisition 
practice, it is a mix of feelings. On the one hand, they are proud of contributing to the 
promotion of local economic and social development by absorbing more farmers with 
little  capital  as  members  and  thus helping  them  gain more  incomes. On the  other 
hand,  however,  they  are  “forced”  to choose  it in  order to make  the  co-operatives’ 
shareholding arrangement in accordance with the Regulation. Through enlisting more 
members, the percentage of the shares they hold would then become less than 20%. 
But as they have contributed a great amount of energy and time to the co-operatives’ 
establishment and operation, they feel that the Regulation decreases their enthusiasm 
to further service for the co-operative, since their investment return becomes limited 
and less than before. 
 
All of the scenarios abovementioned concern co-operative capital acquisition through 
member  contributions.  As  aforementioned,  another  main  capital  source  for  co-
operative  fund-raising  is  the  grants  and  project  funding  provided  by  local 
governments.  Concerning  government  grants,  local  governments  generally  have 
various  policies  to  encourage  the  establishment  of  co-operatives  and  the 
standardization/normalization  of  co-operatives
24. For example, in one municipality, 
local government provides 20,000 rmb as grants to the co -operatives who reach the 
criteria of standardization of the municipal -level, and grants 10,000  rmb to newly 
established  co-operatives
25.  These  criteria  generally  concern  with  the  number  of 
members a co-operative involves, the amount of total share capital it has, the times 
of  trainings  it  organizes  per  year,  the  number  of  households  it  helps  in  gaini ng 
incomes and employment (an indicator showing its capability in local crop -farming 
driving), and whether a democratic management system exists, etc.. Actually it is not 
hard to understand why the government would award those co-operatives who take 
the  social  finality  into  consideration  and  promote  employment  for  more  farmer 
householders,  because  they  facilitate  the  local  government  in  achieving  its  goal  of 
local economic development and thus social stability. Besides, all co-operatives can 
apply for various local governments’ projects in order to gain more capital. But this 
capital is not regarded as shares from the government. It is the government’s funding 
to support the co-operative development or “new rural development”. This source of 
fund-raising can be expected every two years. It means that co-operatives who get 
the  public  funding  this  year  are  not  qualified  to  obtain  another  funding  from  the 
government  next  year.  The  cases  demonstrate  that  many  well-developed  co-
operatives (i.e. those who reach the criteria of normalization or standardization) have 
received  various  project  funding,  with  the  total  amount  reaching  from  more  than 
80,000 rmb to more than one million rmb. 
 
Direct financial support from the government is also complemented by the indirect 
type. For example, it is interesting to mention that, both directors from the BHB and 
DKB co-operatives are local NPC members (National People’s Congress). Therefore, 
they both have the connections with the local government and the ability to make 
proposals  or  have  a  say  concerning  local  co-operative  development.  In  January  of 
2010, one director has submitted a proposal at the provincial NPC Meeting concerning 
stimulating  the  undergraduates  to  work  in  co-operatives.  This  proposal  suggests 
                                                 
24It happens when there are a lot of co-operatives established, but the government concerns that the quality of 
co-operatives should be increased. 
25In 2009 when the fieldwork was conducted, the local official mentioned that this grant of 10,000 rmb is 
abolished,  because the goal to encourage the establishment and development  of co -operatives is already 
achieved. The next step should be to promote the quality of co-operative operation.   17 
granting preferential treatment to the undergraduates wishing to work for a certain 
period of years in the co-operative if they later take the examination aiming to work 
as a civil servant for the government. With respect to it I asked this director if the co-
operative  would  then  have  to  bear  the  opportunity  cost  when  the  undergraduates 
decide to leave for employment in the government while the co-operative has already 
invested  much  energy  and  time  in  cultivating  the  undergraduates  (to  teach  them 
plantation  skills  for  example).  The  director  proposes  correspondingly  that  the  local 
agricultural  bureau  can  organize  trainings  for  them  and  the  local  government  can 
provide salaries to them. Correspondingly, the co-operative can give some premium if 
they work well. Therefore, this innovative system would not require the cost from the 
co-operative but be purely beneficial to its development. Later on the proposal was 
put into practice, which can be regarded as a way of indirect financial support from 
the government to the co-operative (in accordance with the Article 8 of the national 
Law). 
 
Incomes through doing business with non-members outside the local community are 
served  as  another  external  capital  source.  In  this  situation,  the  co-operative 
entrepreneurs  always  make  a  clear  distinction  between  transaction  with  the  local 
residents and with those from outside of the community. For instance, the BHB co-
operative has contracted two vegetable markets. In the market it is free for all local 
farmer  growers  (not  only  for  co-operative  members)  to  sell  vegetables.  But  the 
businessmen from outside are charged market service fees. For the DKB co-operative, 
the director has invented a special packaging system, which can prolong the freshness 
period  of  waxberries.  Therefore,  the  co-operative  came  to  earn  more  income  from 
selling  competitive  products  packed  in  gift  boxes  that  can  be  transported  even  to 
Europe. And thanks to this new packaging design, the co-operative has enlarged its 
market and the supply is since then always far from meeting the crying demand. The 
co-operative  is  open  to all  local  farmer  growers that raise  high-quality  waxberries, 
thus  helping  them  in  earning  more  incomes  (while  the  members  get  an  extra 
patronage  refunds).  While  at  the  same  time,  the  co-operative  itself  is  able  to 
accumulate more capital through operation. 
 
As another external source, loans from lending agencies are really scarce as shown 
from my cases comparing with government funding. Co-operative banks in rural areas 
that have been transformed from formerly rural credit co-operatives can still fail to 
meet  the  co-operatives’  demand  for  credit,  not  to  mention  the  other  commercial 
banks. It is partly because the co-operative itself does not have much fixed capital 
assets that can be used as collateral. The factory buildings established in rural areas, 
for example, cannot be granted with property ownership certificate. Besides, the office 
building belongs sometimes to the processing company affiliated to the co-operative, 
sometimes  to  the  local  public  agencies  that  lend  some  office  space  to  the  co-
operative, and sometimes to the member personally (mostly the initiator of the co-
operative). Moreover, the production land is owned by the rural collective, although 
farmer  members  have  the  land  use  right.  Although  according  to  the  central 
government’s  Number  One  Document  and  other  documents  related,  many  tangible 
assets can be used as collateral, such as farming machines, agricultural greenhouses 
and warehouses, in reality, many banks are actually not willing to accept them as 
collateral
26. Short-term loans or micro -credits that most co -operatives in my cases 
have successfully gained are actually in the name of the director or of the other large 
shareholders.  In  other  words,  personal  assets  or  creditworthiness  from  the  core 
                                                 
26Chen Xiwen, “Three Problems concerning Rural Reform”, from First Financial Daily, see 
http://www.chinareform.net/2010/0531/17397.html  (accessed 31 May 2010).   18 
members are popularly used as collateral for the co-operative in order to gain loans 
from the banks. 
 
Consequently, in order to alleviate the problem of micro-loan shortage co-operatives 
and  farmers  face,  policy  banks  and  guarantee  companies  have  in  some  places 
emerged. This financial innovation is the result of the collaboration among the local 
government, the co-operative bank and the co-operatives. To give one example, in 
one municipality, a guarantee company with the registration capital of ten million rmb 
has been established, with the financial contribution from the local government of five 
million rmb and from the municipal supply and marketing co-operative of five million. 
The  guarantee  company  has  further  signed  an  agreement  with  the  municipal  co-
operative bank, who grants the credit extension attaining 80 million rmb (1: 8 ratio). 
The guarantee company provides “guarantee” to the co-operative bank in favour of 
the co-operatives that need capital. The co-operatives then need to provide a counter-
guarantee to the guarantee company. The existence of the guarantee provided by the 
guarantee company decrease the lending risks for the bank, thus making the bank 
more willing to lend capital to the co-operatives. Through this innovative system the 
local government has played a positive role in activating and circulating the potential 
capital in rural areas, such as trustworthiness and credit (through credit rating and 
assessment), the land use rights (through estimating and pricing land tenure), etc. 
Those  co-operatives  that  are  regarded  to  reach  the  criteria  of  normalization  or 
standardization,  for  example,  can  be  awarded  with  higher  credit  rating,  and  thus 
enjoy preferential treatment when applying for loans. In some other places, the local 
government  also  facilitates  the  cooperation  between  the  co-operatives  and  the 
financial  agencies  by  way  of  establishing  a  rural  co-operative  union.  Because  it  is 
regarded that financial institutions themselves cannot solve the capital constraints the 
co-operatives  face.  Only  when  they  work  together  with  the  co-operative  can  they 
collect  better  information  concerning  co-operative  need  and  creditworthiness  the 
members  have.  This  co-operative  union  is  actually  a  sort  of  comprehensive  co-
operative or associative co-operative organization. But since under the current law, 
only specialized co-operative can be granted with co-operative legal personality, this 
organization has to be registered as social organization under the administration of 
Ministry of Civil Affairs. 
 
Finally,  the  cases  also  indicate  the  role  social  capital  plays  concerning  resource 
dimensions of the co-operatives studied. The most significant phenomenon observed 
is a high level of voluntary work conducted by college graduate village officials and 
local CPC (Communist Party of China) members. 
 
Voluntary  work  in  co-operatives  by  college  graduate  village  officials  is  indirectly 
mobilized by public policy. It is because, recently, finding work for new graduates has 
become one of the country’s top priorities. Correspondingly, the central government 
has launched a recruitment campaign since the beginning of 2008. Until now a total of 
1.3 million college graduates have voluntarily applied for jobs and 159,000 have been 
recruited
27. They were working in the local villages in  1381 counties in 31 provinces, 
autonomous regions and province -level municipalities. The villages I visited are no 
exception. In many cases I am informed that the village officials also provide extra 
working  hours  in  co -operatives  because  “there  is  not  always  work  to  do  in  the 
committee” (interviews in the field). This voluntary work happens especially when the 
director of the co-operative is also engaged in the village committee or village party 
                                                 
27China  plans  to  recruit  36,000  college  graduate  village  officials  in  2010,  
http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6977428.html (accessed 07 May 2010).   19 
branch as village head or village party secretary. 
 
While at the same time, voluntary engagement by the local CPC members is directly 
motivated by public policy. The CPC rural grassroots organizations are regarded as the 
basis for the CPC rural work which is to promote “scientific development in rural areas 
and to lead farmers to get rich” (stressed by The Fourth Plenary Session of the 17
th 
CPC Central Committee). The CPC members are taught to fully play a pioneering and 
model  role  in  local  areas  in  “promoting  development  and  serving  and  uniting  the 
people”.  Therefore,  co-operatives  party  branch  and  Party  member’s  employment 
promotion  service  centre  have  in  several  cases  also  been  witnessed.  One  best 
example illustrating their voluntary work is “first-aid repair and rebuilding of the co-
operatives’ greenhouse after snow storm or typhoon disaster” (interviews in the field). 
Not surprisingly, many college graduate village officials are also CPC members. In one 
case of a newly-established co-operative by ten college graduate village officials from 
nearby villages in one county, five of them are Party members. 
 
Besides, although the law mentions social donations  in cash and regards it as one 
type of non-members capital involvement in co-operatives, in reality, they are rarely 




In this paper I have investigated the capital base of new agricultural co-operatives in 
China. Cases studied indicate a hybridization feature of the co-operative capital base, 
including  members’  contributions,  public  subsidies,  income  from  the  market  sale, 
institutional  capital  and  social  capital  in  the  form  of  donations  over  time.  In  these 
multi-stakeholder co-operatives, two stakeholder groups, namely, core members and 
government  agencies  as  non-member  stakeholders  appear  to  be  the  main 
contributors to co-operative capital formation. 
 
Different from the situation in the West, debt capital does not appear to be a widely-
used traditional financing source. New co-operatives in China have difficulty even in 
borrowing  short-term  debt,  not  to  mention  borrowing  long-term  loans.  Also 
specialized/non-traditional external sources of capital such as those provided by co-
operative  banks  do  not  suffice.  Co-operative  banks  are  also  not  always  ready  to 
provide  micro-credit  to  co-operatives.  It  is  not  only  due  to  the  fact  that  lending 
agencies are uncomfortable with the co-operatives’ unorthodox ownership structure, 
but also because co-operatives in China are regarded to have little capital assets on 
their own which can be used as collateral. Only when the government plays an active 
role does this lending process facilitate. Moreover, many innovative financial systems 
are  observed  in  the  field,  which  facilitate  the  mobilization  of  more  external  debt 
capital for co-operatives. Furthermore, since it is believed that those policy supports 
and indirect financial supports have better quality than government grants, the local 
government  has  gradually  abolished  grants  for  newly-established  co-operatives,  as 
the numbers of co-operatives are increasing. 
 
Through comparing the co-operative rules-in-form and its practice, I discover that (1) 
although the Regulation allows financial contributions either in cash or non-monetary 
property,  in  reality  it  is  always  in  the  form  of  cash  in  FSCs
28; (2) although the 
                                                 
28It should be noted that although in land-based SHCs, land tenure right is also used as share capital. For more 
information, see Zhao and Develtere (2010b).   20 
Regulation sets  a  limitation on the  number of shares  every  member may  own  (no 
more than 20% of the total shares), in reality it is not always achieved initially. When 
a co-operative is required to change its shareholding arrangement later in accordance 
with  the  Regulation,  in  some  cases  its  initiator  (as  core  member)  feels  that  his 
motivation and enthusiasm to work in the co-operative have decreased; (3) a specific 
limit on the dividend rate a co-operative can pay in proportion to the patronage is 
specified  as  no  less  than  60%  of  the  total  net  earnings,  and  in  reality  many  co-
operatives  choose  to  increase  this  percentage  in  order  to  motivate  the  small-scale 
members with little capital assets to join in the co-operatives; (4) all co-operatives 
choose to draw common reserve funds in practice, although it is not a prerequisite but 
only  suggested  by  the  Law;  (5)  the  Law  has  displayed  a  strong  government 
preferential policy towards co-operative development, and it happens also in reality, 
through direct and indirect ways of government financial support. Through this way 
however, different from what happened in some other developing countries where co-
operatives have become more government-oriented, the cases studied prove that co-
operatives  remain  as  member-controlled  self-managed  organizations.  After  all,  the 
main capital contribution still comes from members. 
 
Now I need to answer the last research question raised in Section I, namely, to what 
extent  new  co-operatives  have  indeed  opened  their  doors  to  different  forms  of 
member  capital  investments  and  non-member  capital  participation.  The  evidence 
shows that three customary forms of member capitalization exist in co-operatives in 
China,  namely,  member  shares,  membership  fees,  and  surplus  retention  as  the 
creation of institutional capital. When co-operatives enlarge their capital base, it  is 
always the co-operative entrepreneurs (as one initiator or a group of initiators) that 
decide  by  which  way  co-operative  fund-raising  would  be  done,  through  mobilizing 
more capital shares by the existing members or involving new members. Accordingly 
different practices are also observed in the field. If the co-operative entrepreneurs are 
a small group of big-scale farmers who together invest in the establishment of the co-
operative, it comes out mostly that they would not prefer to open the door to new 
members who are incapable of contributing as much capital as they do. Facing the 
same  difficulty  in  borrowing  loans  from  the  banks,  internal  financing  is  another 
mostly-used  way  to  raise  capital  inside  the  co-operative.  In  this  situation  the 
members  tend  to  be  more  homogeneous  with  respect  to  capital  and  patronage 
contributions. Whereas in the situation when the establishment of the co-operative is 
mostly influenced by one co-operative entrepreneur who regards the co-operative as a 
social  enterprise  and  promotes  the  “social  finality”  of  the  co-operative,  the  co-
operative appears to be more open to new members. And a new membership design 
is conducted dividing all the members into different categories. Different from new co-
operatives in the West (in which there exists a division of voting stocks and nonvoting 
stocks), the SHCs in China grant all the shareholders a vote. In order to protect the 
motivation  of  big  shareholders,  some  co-operatives  adopt  a  specific  policy  in  their 
Charter  to  make  investor  members  enjoy  additional  voting  rights  (yet  still  with  a 
maximum  limitation).  Also  except  from  the  fact  that  all  the  members  enjoy  the 
patronage  refunds  (because  in  China,  the  investor  members  are  generally  also 
growers and sell their products to the co-operative), the investor members receive 
extra  dividends.  Through adopting  this  proportional  voting  and  distributing  system, 
the  SHCs  take  the  contributions  different  members  provide  into  consideration,  and 
allocate  surplus  share  and  voice  accordingly,  thus  trying  to  balance  the  various 
interests  of  co-operative  stakeholders.  This  in  turn  helps  the  co-operative  in 
mobilizing additional resources, not only from new members’ capital contribution but 
also from the government awards as well (because the co-operative strives for social 
finality  and  promotes  prosperity  and  employment  for  more  farmer  householders).   21 
However, non-member investors are not yet witnessed in the study. All farmers that 
provide capital are designated as members. This can be also achieved through  the 
consignment agreement design in the co-operative. 
 
The main consequence for the capital base in the cases lies in the fact that there co-
exist a small number of big shareholders and a great number of small shareholders. 
This  reality  of  member  heterogeneity  coincides  with  the  evidence  that  most  co-
operatives in the region have been initiated by co-operative entrepreneurs with the 
ability to invest. Some of them attract afterwards other farmer-producers as patron-
members  who  provide  mostly  only  a  small  amount  of  qualified/basic  shares,  or 
membership fees. Share capital from the members appears always to be the most 
important financial source, especially for the newly organized co-operative, which is 
good for co-operative sustainability because it helps the co-operative to remain as a 
member-controlled organization. However, in order to get government project funding 
and  grants,  some  co-operatives  need  to  mend  up  their  shareholding  arrangement 
which should meet the requirements of the co-operative standardization. It means the 
percentage of shares owned by the initiator should decrease (to less than 20% of the 
total  shares).  This  may  de-motivate  the  co-operative  entrepreneurs  who  have 
invested  a  lot  in  the  establishment  and  operation  of  the  co-operatives,  since  it 
impedes them to gain more economic opportunities. 
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